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WILLIAM T. PIZZI
LESSONS FROM REFORMING
INQUISITORIAL SYSTEMS
William T. Pizzi*
1. Italy's New Criminal Code
In 1989, Italy adopted a new code of criminal
procedure aimed at transforming an inquisitorial trial
system into a system that would include a number of
adversary protections.' Everyone agreed that the
Italian system badly needed major reform. The old
system had degenerated to the point that Italy's trial
system incorporated almost all of the negative aspects
one associates with inquisitorial systems-the secret
assembly of an investigative file, the dominant
importance of this investigative file at the trial, and a
near total concentration of power in the judiciary.
But although the reforms embodied in the new
code were eagerly anticipated, they have not worked
well in practice. For example, the attempt to transfer
primary responsibility for the presentation of
evidence from the judges to the parties has run into
problems because it has been difficult for judges to let
themselves be bound by the decisions of the parties.
A similar problem has thwarted the code's attempt to
introduce a limited form of plea bargaining. Al-
though it permits plea bargaining in minor criminal
cases with a fixed sentencing discount in exchange for
the bargain, plea bargaining is not used often because
judges have a difficult time accepting bargains that
mean that a defendant will receive a sentence that is
less than he or she deserves for the crime in question.
The intellectual difficulty that Italian judges have
had making the transition to an adversarial system
may seem puzzling to readers unfamiliar with civil
law systems and comfortable in a system where plea
bargaining is the norm. But if one grows up in the
legal culture where judges have a responsibility to see
that the trial arrives at the truth and to see that the
sentence imposed is fair and just, it is not easy to turn
primary responsibility for the development of
evidence over to the parties or to accept procedures
that require a judge to pronounce a sentence that is
less than the sentence the judge would give the same
offender without plea bargaining. Whatever happens
in Italy in the years ahead, its recent experience is
evidence that changing legal traditions and institu-
tions is not an easy matter.
2. Parallels in the New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines
But what does Italy's experience have to do with
sentencing guidelines in federal courts? The answer is
that the parallels between the two systems are strong.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
Sentencing at the time Marvin Frankel wrote his
influential book calling for reform2 was a highly
inquisitorial procedure with tremendous sentencing
discretion vested in a single judge and, as a practical
matter, no checks on that discretion. It was not
uncommon, even for non-violent offenses, for an
offender to be facing a sentencing range of from zero
to twenty years in prison. The judge would enter the
courtroom armed with the equivalent of a civil law
file-a presentence report the contents of which had
usually not been revealed to the prosecution or the
defense. After listening to a one-sided presentation
from the defense lawyer (the tradition being that the
prosecutor "stood mute" at sentencing) and a few
mumbled words from the defendant, the judge
announced a sentence within the broad sentencing
range that the judge considered appropriate for the
offender and the offense. Sentencing philosophies
varied considerably from judge to judge, even in the
same district.
That this system had serious structural flaws and
needed reform was pretty obvious. But what the
drafters of sentencing guidelines may have failed to
appreciate was just how difficult it would be for those
involved in sentencing to adjust to a system that
operates on radically different premises. Sentencing
under a tight guideline system clashes sharply not
only with what federal judges had traditionally been
doing at sentencing, but with how federal judges (and
others) see their role in the system. Prior to the
guideline era, the federal judiciary served as a safety
valve or a backstop. If a judge believed that the law to
be applied was too harsh and punitive for what the
defendant had actually done, or if the judge (and
perhaps the prosecutor, too) believed that the
defendant truly "deserved a second chance," the old
sentencing system permitted a judge to sentence
consistent with those beliefs. On the other hand,
whatever the plea may have been, the judge was
usually fully aware of the scope of the defendant's
criminal activities and the broad sentencing range
made it easy to impose sentences that were propor-
tionate to the offender's actual wrongdoing.
Much of the power that judges had "to make
things come out right" has been eliminated by the
guidelines and it is at times frustrating for judges to
work within the guideline system. The guidelines are
asking judges to accept a redefinition of what it
means to be a federal judge in the criminal justice
system. That is not easy for them to accept, especially
when difficult cases come along that require them to
impose sentences that they would not have imposed
in the pre-guidelines era.
3. Lessons for the Sentencing Commission
There continues to be a high level of hostility
toward the guidelines on the part of federal judges
and this hostility concerns me and ought to concern
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the Sentencing Commission. While I take many of the
accusations and criticisms leveled against the guide-
lines by federal judges with a grain of salt (and think
the Commission should do the same), the reality is
that a strong sentencing system needs the support of
the judiciary. To hear reports of districts where the
judges permit or even encourage defense attorneys
and prosecutors to work around the guidelines is
disturbing. While some commissioners may feel
angry at such judges for subverting the guideline
process, the Commission needs to understand that the
guidelines are asking an awful lot of federal judges in
terms of the way judges are being asked to see
themselves within the system.
Now that the guidelines have been in place for a
while and most judges understand that they are a
reality, a major priority of the Commission should be
to try to dissipate some of the judicial hostility to the
guidelines. At a minimum, are there not ways to give
judges a larger role in reforming the guidelines so
that they feel more conmmitted to the sentencing
system under which they are working? Are there not
also ways to give judges somewhat more flexibility
without undercutting the premises of the guideline
system? Would it not make sense to try to simplify the
guidelines so that they seem less mechanistic and
permit judges to feel that it is they who are in control
of sentencing?
I don't pretend to have easy answers to offer the
Commission. But I think a Commission that under-
stands the difficulties for federal judges as the nature
of their judicial power is redefined is far more likely
to improve the situation than a Commission that
views the problem as simply a battle of wills in which
any concession is a sign of weakness.
As Italy threatens to demonstrate, history is full
of attempted reforms of legal institutions that never
achieve their goals because they are eventually
overwhelmed by the legal cultures into which they
are introduced. It would be wise for the Commission
to keep that lesson in mind.
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